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As a check on the accuracy of the estimating equation, revenue estimates f1
the 26 existing racing states with complete data are compared to actual reven
The average estimate error is calculated by squaring the difference between t"'
estimate and actual revenue, dividing by 26 and taking the square root.
average error is $7.8 million, 40 percent of the 26 state revenue average of$19·'
million. For comparison, estimates were made by multiplying national
capita revenue, $3.36 per thousand, by each state's population. Indiana,
revenue estimate is $18.5 million using this method. However, the average erri ·
for the 26 racing states is $18.8 million, or96 percent ofaverage revenue. Clead
the regression equation estimates are much more accurate than the per capi
based estimates.
Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the amount of revenue whicl
Indiana could likely raise by taxing horse race wagering is insignificant conf
pared to the state's annual budget of about $7 billion. Under various por
assumptions, the sta:te could raise between $2 and $14 million from such taxi .
with $5 million the most likely estimate within that range. The $11.5 millio1'
estimate made at the time of the 1977 parimutuel law debate appears to be big
The debate on the legalization of horse race wagering should thus focus not
its tax revenue potential, but on the merits of the activity itself - its entertai
ment value, and its social and economic consequences.
NOTES
The Indianapolis Star, 20 January and 25 March 1977, 6 January 1979. For the 1977 India
Parimutuel Law see Laws of Indiana, 1977, vol. I, P.L. 47. For the 1979 Indiana Supre
Court decision see State of Indiana; Hoosier Horse Industries, Inc. v. Joseph H. Nixon,
N.E. 2d 152.
2. The National Association of State Racing Commissioners, Pari-Mutuel Racing, 1984 (Lexin
ton, KY.: 1985).
3. A Gruen, "An Inquiry into the Economics of Race-Track Gambling," Journal of Politi
Economy 84 (February, 1976 ): 169-77; D. B. Suits, "The Elasticity of Demand for Gambling,,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (February, 1979): 155-62; W. A. Morgan and J.
Vasche, "A Note on the Elasticity of Demand for Wagering," Applied Economics 14 (Octobe~
1982): 469-74. Morgan and Vasche find the elasticity of the handle to be-1.3, Gruen gets-l .57i
and Suits' estimates range from -1.59 to -2.73.
4. R. S. Guthrie, "Taxing Horse Race Gambling: The Revenue Potential," Public Finan,
Quarter(v 9 (January, 1981): 79-90.
5. D. Pescatrice, "The Inelastic Demand for Wagering," Applied Economics 12 (March, 1980'
I.
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Costs of State Vehicle and
Driver Licensing in Indiana:
A Comparison with Other States*
MARILYN K. SPENCER
ROBERTS. MAIN
Butler University

I

ndiana is unique as the only state of the union to rely upon the
political patronage system for the actual provision of vehicle and driver licensing
services, with coordination and data collection handled by the State Bureau of
Motor Vehicles. The governor appoints the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Motor Vehicles (BMV), who appoints a manager recommended by the party
chairman in each of the 92 counties. The county license branches are allowed to
keep a specified amount of the revenues collected (retained revenues). The
remainder of the revenues accrues to the state's Motor Vehicle Highway
Accounts, except a small amount that the other major party collects from
personalized license plates. The disposition of the funds retained by the license
branches is at the discretion of the county party chairmen. Some portion of those
funds offsets the costs of running the branches, and some portion accrues to the
county party.
We compare the costs in Indiana to what we would expect them to be, given
the costs in the other states. This comparison sheds light on whether Indiana has
higher or lower costs, once we control for relevant output and input differences.
Political patronage may provide services at lower resource cost than government
bureaucracy. Even though each county party chair is assured of a four-year
monopoly following each gubernatorial election, a motive indeed exists to
promote efficiency. Given that net revenues after paying operating costs accrue
to the chairmen, they have a strong incentive to reduce operating costs. However, we have no reliable data on the actual costs incurred by the license
branches. We know their cost is less than their retained revenues, but not how
much less. Lower operating costs may not mean lower costs to taxpayers and
licensees.
For most of the states, costs of licensing are itemized in the budgets of their
motor vehicle bureaus. However, they may not include the costs of buildings and
grounds, which in Indiana are directly paid for by the license branches.
*We wish to thank Duane Leatherman, Prem Sharma, John Brand, and numerous licensing officials
of several states for their valuable contributions.
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The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections including theory
and evidence, methodology and empirical results, and the conclusions and
policy implications.
Economic theory suggests several reasons for a government provider to
have higher costs than a private contracfor. The primary reason is that a
government manager is not rewarded for reducing costs. Even in a large private
corporation, a manager obtains some rewards for lowering costs. In contrast, a
government manager tends to be rewarded for having a bigger bureau. Further,
civil service requirements make firing unproductive employees more difficult.
(See Williamson, 1964, Downs, 1965, Alchian, 1965, Alchianand Demsetz 1972,
Bennett and Johnson 1980, and Spann 1977.)
Several empirical studies have compared costs of private versus public
provision of government services. We are not aware of any literature relating
directly to driver and vehicle licensing, or to the comparison of the costs of ,
government versus patronage-private monopoly provision. Conceptually closest to our research are studies concerning fire departments and refuse collection.
Ahlbrandt (1973) compared of the costs of public provision of fire protection
with the costs of a private fire department and found that private costs were
approximately 47 percent less. Several refuse collection studies have come up
with contradictory results, however. Hirsch (1965) found no significant difference between the costs of public and private organizations. Kemper and Quigley
( 1976) and Stevens ( 1978) found private provision to be more costly than public,
and competitive private provision to be more costly than monopoly private
production. Kitchen (1976) and Bennett and Johnson (1979) found private
provision to be substantially less costly than public provision.
It is possible that public provision of vehicle and driver licensing is more
costly than private provision. If so, competitive bidding for the right to provide
these services would be expected to cost less. It is plausible that the noncompetitive award of this right to county party chairmen is less costly as well. If ever they
want to increase revenues per transaction, they must have those increases
legislated. Most bureaucratic budget increases do not suffer that amount of
public scrutiny.
The next section discusses our test of the costs in Indiana, relative to
provision elsewhere.
The costs which a state administrative agency would incur to provide
license branch service in Indiana can be estimated by examining other states.
Theory suggests that the cost of providing these services depends on the number
of transactions performed and other institutional and environmental factors.
Our first procedure is to regress budgetary costs on these variables for the other
states. The final equation is of the form:
C.1 a 0 + a 1T 1 + a 2T 12 + a 3 lnT1 + a 4 E·1 + u·1

=

(I)
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where i represents the state, C is the budgetary cost, T is the number of
automobile registrations, titles, and drivers' licenses issued, the transformations
ofT measure economies of scale, equalling the square ofT and the natural log of
T, E denotes the number of state employees, and u is the error term.
With regression coefficient values from the other states, we then calculate
Indiana's expected costs by inserting Indiana's observed values for the independent variables into the equation

c• =W'

"'B

(2)

where c• is the predicted cost for Indiana, W' is the vector of values that the
independent variables take in the state of Indiana, and represents the estimated coefficients from the regression. This estimated number is then compared
to the sum of actual BMV costs and retained revenues. To test whether the
current system results in significantly different costs, we apply a two-tailed t-test
to the differential between actual and predicted costs. The interval around c• is
of the form

S

c• "!: td
where

12

s[1 + W'(X'xrl

WJ 1/2

t = (actual costs - calculated costs) / S,
S is the standard error of estimate and X is the matrix of observations from the
other states.
Completion of the project required cooperation from state governments.
Expecting that not all states would have up-to-date information, we asked for
1981 data. Forty states responded, including Indiana, although missing data
pared the usable observations down to 35. Not all states provide exactly the same
services. We could only imperfectly adjust for this diversity.
The equation represented in Table 1 is the least squares estimate of the costs
of provision. The number of full-time equivalent state employees (EMPLOYEE) is significant and of the expected sign. EMPLOYEE is highly correlated with all of the output variables, with simple correlations of 0.817, 0.899,
and 0.592, respectively. Yet, surprisingly, it still exerts a strong individual
influence on COST.
Because registrations, titles, and licenses are all highly correlated with costs
and each other, we added them together to obtain a measure of total transactions. No a priori expectation was assigned to the portion of the function relating
to output, since theory did not indicate whether scale economies should exist.
The coefficients on transactions (OUTPUT), its square (OUTPUTSQ), and its
natural log (LNOUTPUT) imply the existence of scale diseconomies throughout
the entire range of output.
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TABLE 2. Determinants of Costs in Indiana
TABLE 1. Cost as a Function of Output and Input Variables

Constant
OUTPUT
OUTPUTSQ
LNOUTPUT
EMPLOYEE
adjusted R 2
F
S.E.E.
n

-15 537 x 104**
'
-3.79261**
25.93863 x 10-8**
11,801 x 103**
6,795.03056**
.97819
371.05116
47,787 x 102
34

t-values
-3.500
-3.356
7.223
3.642
3.208

*p < .05
.01

••p <

Originally, we had included measures of population dispersion, other
inputs and outputs, and contractual and institutional arrangements. Included in
our population measures were its absolute size, the population density, and a
Gini index. Other inputs and outputs considered were the costs oflicense plates,
the frequency of their issuance, vehicle inspections, number of license branch
offices, the number of offices leased, and the average monthly earnings of
full-time state employees not involved in education. We created dummy variables for county and other non-state provision of titles and registrations and of
driver licenses. None of these had significant explanatory power.
Table 2 includes the actual values for the independent variables and cost of
provision in the state oflndiana. We concluded that we could not reject the null
hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance. Indiana costs were over $7 million
higher than predicted. Although this difference was substantial, the actual
Indiana costs were within the range predicted by the model. While the adjusted
R2 was quite high, there was some variation in costs for all the states in the
sample that was unaccounted for by the model. The purpose of the t-test is to
judge whether Indiana costs are significantly different from what we would
expect if they were drawn from the same population as the states in the sample.

EMPLOYEEa
OUTPUTa
OUTPUTSQ
LNOUTPUT
Actual Costsa
Predicted Costs

474
8,261,181
682,471.115 x 108
15.927078
$29,417,708
22,181,772

a Source: Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
The next section will discuss the policy implications that the results of the
study might indicate.
The study suggests that the current Indiana system has resulted in costs that
are not significantly different from costs in other states. If these results had
indicated higher costs, this would not necessarily mean that the current system is
less efficient than direct state provision. The level of service may be perceived as
. higher under patronage than under direct state operation. If such a gain in
consumer benefits outweighs the extra costs, the patronage system would be
more efficient despite higher costs. A survey of individuals who purchase
licenses is necessary to draw a conclusion concerning efficiency. Another consideration in evaluating the efficiency of the current system is that the revenues
retained by the license branches are greater than the costs of operation. Thus,
costs that are not significantly lower may indicate that statutory rates of retention are too high.
Even if the current system had been found to be significantly more efficient,
we could not conclude that it is the most desirable system of providing licensing
services for at least two reasons, First, the issue of the desirability of such a
system has political and ethical dimensions which may outweigh any finding
concerning narrowly defined economic efficiency. Second, regardless of how
that political argument is resolved, there may be methods of organization which
are preferable to either direct state operation or patronage, including competitive bid contracting.
In September 1985, Governor Orr stated that, for the sa~e of public
confidence, he was recommending total state operation of the license branch
system. However, he warned that costs of such a system would be substantially
higher than with the present patronage system. Our findings indicate that a state
system that is no less efficient than systems in other states should not cost
substantially more.
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